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ZURCHER: THIRD PARTY SEARCHES
AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
CHARLES L. CANTRELL*
INTRODUCTION
The recent case of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily' has provided
the United States Supreme Court with the opportunity to re-
solve some crucial problems of interpretation in the areas of the
first and fourth amendments. This case, perhaps more than
any other, accurately establishes the Burger Court's position in
situations which involve a conflict of fourth and first amend-
ment values.
The case arose from a controversial search of the newspaper
offices of the Stanford Daily. The search was conducted by
local police officers pursuant to a valid search warrant. The
affidavit in support of the warrant established the fact that
there was probable cause to believe that there were certain
photographs of a violent demonstration in which some police
officers were seriously injured. Neither the newspaper nor any-
one else connected with the newspaper was ever considered a
suspect in the investigation.
The procedure followed in the search was found to be un-
constitutional by a federal district court in California.2 Its opin-
ion, which was subsequently adopted by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,3 was far-reaching and
highly controversial.
Both lower courts held that a subpoena duces tecum was
the proper method for obtaining evidence from a third party
not considered a suspect in the criminal investigation. The
courts held that a search warrant could only be used if the
requesting party established that a subpoena duces tecum
would be impractical. Moreover, if important first amendment
interests were involved, an even greater showing of impractica-
bility would be necessary.
This article will address the Supreme Court's opinion in
Zurcher and attempt to analyze the Court's rationale and rul-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; LL.M. 1976, Uni-
versity of Texas; J.D. 1972, Baylor University.
1. 98 S. Ct. 1970 (1978).
2. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
3. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977).
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ing. The author believes that the Court gave insufficient con-
sideration to several first amendment interests in the case and
made some dubious presumptions about the motivations and
inclinations of prosecutors. The resultant holding of the Court
illustrates a marked insensitivity to press interests. These
objections aside, the most serious inadequacy of the decision is
the broad and wide ranging effect of its language. The complex
issues involved deserve the serious attention of all those in the
legal profession and the very real threat to the freedom of the
press presented by Zurcher merits the concern of all individu-
als who value this constitutional liberty.
THIRD PARTY SEARCHES: A FOURTH AMENDMENT INTERPRETATION
Great difficulty ensues when a fourth amendment analysis
is applied to third party searches. As a matter of precedent, no
cases prior to Zurcher discussed when a subpoena duces tecum
should be issued instead of a search warrant when law enforce-
ment agencies wished to acquire criminal evidence from one
unconnected to a crime.
Historically, the guarantees of the fourth amendment were
viewed as protections enjoyed by the criminal suspect and,
when viewed in a constitutional context, were considered to be
"personal" in nature. Courts reinforced this personal rights
doctrine by analyzing fourth amendment issues in terms of
standing.' When a law enforcement agency wanted information
from an innocent third party, a subpoena duces tecum was
normally employed. In cases where a search warrant was used,
the third party rarely had standing to complain since the evi-
dence obtained in the search was not to be used against him.
In arriving at the conclusion that a showing of impractica-
bility had to be made with regard to a subpoena duces tecum
before a search warrant could lawfully issue,- the district court
relied upon a number of factors. The first was an erroneous
interpretation of prior case law. Although dicta may have gen-
erally supported some type of specialized protection of third
parties,8 there certainly was no direct case law supporting the
4. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
5. 353 F. Supp. at 132.
6. See, e.g., Owens v. Way, 141 Ga. 796, 82 S.E. 132 (1914):
[Tihe power of an arresting officer to take the property of the defendant, to be
used as evidence of the crime charged against him in the warrant, is quite
different from the taking of the property of third persons by virtue of no other
process save that of the warrant against the accused. The constitutional protec-
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broad proposition that a showing of impracticability was neces-
sary. Secondly, the lower court attempted to restrictively inter-
pret Warden v. Hayden7 to mean that the abrogation of the
"mere evidence" rule applied only in cases concerning the
searches of "suspects." The court supported this dubious prop-
osition by expressing its view that third parties did not possess
adequate safeguards against searches.8 Reasoning further that
tion against unreasonable seizure of property would go for naught, if it should
be conceded that an arresting officer may arbitrarily possess himself of the
property of a third person, taken from the place of business of such third person,
solely upon the ground that it may be used as evidence against the defendant
in the warrant. We find no authority which extends the power of an arresting
officer so far. And, indeed, if one with a warrant for A., charging him with crime,
may go into the house of B. and take therefrom property belonging to B., without
other authority than that it may be used as evidence on the trial of A., then the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable seizures would be mere idle words.
Id. at 798, 82 S.E. at 133.
However, the Owens case dealt with the warrantless seizure of a third party's
property when the ostensible authority was an arrest warrant for another person. In
Commodity Mfg. Co. v. Moore, 198 N.Y.S. 45 (Sup. Ct. 1923), the court held:
No case has been cited where the court has gone so far as to say that property,
not an instrument of a crime, but only evidence of its commission, and which
was the property of some one besides the defendant, could be seized either under
a search warrant or as an incident of the arrest of defendant.
I can well believe that property used in the commission of a crime, even
though belonging to a third party, might properly be seized, and also that
property not used in the commission of the crime, but containing evidence of
the commission of the crime, might properly be seized, where it is the property
of the person accused; but to sanction the seizure of the property of innocent
persons, or persons not accused, not used in the commission of the crime, but
merely because they contained evidence of the crime, would open the door to
grave abuses of invasion of property rights.
Id. at 47.
The court's emphasis upon evidence which was not used in the commission of a
crime severely undercuts the entire rationale. Since the discarding of the "mere evi-
dence" rule, there is no meaningful distinction as to what may be seized. Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
The district court further stated that it was settled that an arrest warrant cannot
issue for a material witness unless the magistrate has reason to believe that a subpoena
is impractical. Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971). Citing scholarly
works which indicate that unlawful seizures had been more protected under the fourth
amendment than unlawful arrests, the court attempted to draw an analogy requiring
a showing that a subpoena would be impractical. See Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A
No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 474, 475 (1961); Orfield,
Warrant of Arrest and Summons Upon Complaint in Federal Criminal Procedure, 27
U. CN. L. Rav. 1 (1958).
The district court extended the Bacon holding far beyond its basis. Although there
is a presumption that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure may implement some
of the fourth amendment guarantees, Bacon was decided on a statutory and not a
constitutional basis. See 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (1966); FED. R. CmIM. P. 46(b).
7. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
8. 353 F. Supp. at 130.
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the exclusionary rule was the underlying basis of the Warden
opinion and that that rationale necessarily implied that the
Supreme Court in Warden had considered only those individu-
als who could make use of the rule, the district court found that
only "suspects" were affected by Warden's ruling. Finally, the
district court found that, if law enforcement agencies were not
obliged to exhaust the subpoena route, the fourth amendment
rights of nonsuspects would be inadequately protected.9
Although the Supreme Court categorically rejected these
propositions, 0 its own analysis was incomplete, especially in
regard to third party interests. Relying on the Alderman rule
of restricted standing," the Court found that the added deter-
rent to police misconduct did not justify further encroachment
upon the public interest in the prosecution of those accused of
crimes. While reaffirming its standing rule based on the public
interest in furthering prosecutions, the Court ignored at least
two vital societal interests.
The first important effect of this ruling is that it denies
third parties a judicial forum in which a determination can be
made regarding their claims for opposing the production of
materials. Clearly, society would regard such third party rela-
tionships as attorney-client or doctor-patient to be justifiably
entitled to a high degree of respect. Without a prior judicial
determination, these privileges cannot be raised or enforced.
Moreover, many other possible constitutional, common law
and statutory privileges exist which would defeat a request for
production under a subpoena.
These privileges have customarily been respected in past
practice. The method employed to gain access to such informa-
tion in the custody of third parties was traditionally the sub-
poena route." To allow search warrants to be issued in such
cases denies the third party of his primary privilege or right.
The relatively simple test for probable cause to search effec-
9. Id. at 131-32.
10. 98 S. Ct. at 1980 n.9.
11. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 173-75 (1969).
We adhere. . . to the general rule that Fourth Amendment rights are per-
sonal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted . . . . There is no
necessity to exclude evidence against one defendant in order to protect the rights
of another. No rights of the victim of an illegal search are at stake when the
evidence is offered against some other party.
Id. at 174.
12. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). See also Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
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tively precludes any meaningful review for the third party who
is both uninformed and not present. 3
The use of search warrants in this context would constitute
a deprivation of due process if an analogy could be drawn to
other cases which have required a hearing before property is
taken from a third party." Where any type of state or govern-
mental action is involved, due process requires that, except in
emergencies, no seizure of property may occur unless notice
and an opportunity to oppose the seizure is provided. 5 It would
certainly seem appropriate that this principle be extended to
ex parte searches of third parties. State action is at its highest
concentration in criminal actions wherein the state is a princi-
ple party. In addition, there are no measures which serve to
adequately safeguard the third party's interest such as a re-
plevin bond in prejudgment remedy cases. Moreover, the de-
gree of intrusion is greater and the invasion of privacy is irre-
versible in third party search cases.
Mr. Justice Stewart expressed this principle clearly in
Fuentes v. Shevin5 when he stated:
The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of
the duty of government to follow a fair process of decision-
making when it acts to deprive a person of his posses-
sions .... [T]he prohibition against the deprivation of
property without due process of law reflects the high value,
embedded in our constitutional and political history, that we
place on a person's right to enjoy what is his, free of govern-
mental interference ....
The requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard
13. The Supreme Court quoted the following with approval in regard to probable
cause: " '[olnce it is established that probable cause exists to believe a federal crime
has been committed a warrant may issue for the search of any property which the
magistrate has probable cause to believe may be the place of concealment of evidence
of the crime.'" 98 S. Ct. at 1978 (quoting United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank,
536 F.2d 699, 703 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977)). See also State v.
Tunnel Citgo Services, 149 N.J. Super. 427, 433, 374 A.2d 32. 35 (1977).
14. See North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
15. Some cases which have traditionally required that opportunity for a hearing
must be provided before the deprivation at issue takes effect are as follows: Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971); Wisconsin
v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970);
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 551 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S.
126, 152 (1941); Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385 (1908).
16. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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raises no impenetrable barrier .... But the fair process
of decisionmaking that it guarantees works, by itself, to
protect against arbitrary deprivation of property ....
[S]ubstantively unfair and simply mistaken deprivations of.
property interests can be prevented . . ..
The second important societal interest at stake is the pri-
vacy interests of the innocent third party. Subsequent to
Zurcher, there is absolutely no rule prohibiting law enforce-
ment agencies from regularly searching businesses that retain
information on potential defendants and suspects. Groups such
as credit agencies, computer companies, utilities or any other
legitimate enterprise may now be searched without warning for
any evidence related to a crime.
Zurcher, then, does nothing less than shatter the privacy
expectations of businesses and individuals everywhere. These
types of searches will undoubtedly be thorough and will neces-
sarily expose numerous files containing confidential informa-
tion concerning other individuals to the eyes of the police. Such
a needless invasion of privacy may now occur as a matter of
routine police procedure. Furthermore, searches of this nature
will involve the unnecessary invasion of innocent parties' pri-
vacy without any demonstration that a subpoena would be
impractical.
THE "REASONABLENESS" OF THIRD PARTY SEARCHES
In determining the constitutionality of a search under the
fourth amendment, the key question is whether, under the
facts and circumstances, the search is "reasonable."' 18 In addi-
tion to considering all of the special circumstances of each case,
"reasonableness" also includes a careful balancing of the needs
of society against those of the individual.'" Such a test that
considers all relevant factors does not lend itself to a set of rigid
predetermined rules concerning "reasonableness. '"20
In Zurcher, the Supreme Court identified "probable cause"
to search as the most critical element in determining whether
17. Id. at 80-81 (citation omitted).
18. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
19. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 900 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
20. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 (1976); Roaden v. Kentucky,
413 U.S. 496, 501 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433, 509-10 (1971)
(Black, J., concurring and dissenting). See also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,
439-42 (1973) (where an analysis is made of the type of factors often considered by the
courts in determining whether a search was "reasonable").
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a search was reasonable. 2' A substantial body of scholarship
exists with respect to the proposition that the tests for reasona-
ble cause to arrest and probable cause to search are distinct
and do not encompass the same elements. 22 Reaffirming this
principle, 23 that neither the right to search nor the legality of
the search is dependent on the right to arrest, the Court went
on to find that no meaningful difference existed between the
probable cause required to search a suspect's possessions and
those of a third party. Justice White observed:
The Fourth Amendment has itself struck the balance be-
tween privacy and public need, and there is no occasion or
justification for a court to revise the Amendment and strike
a new balance by denying the search warrant in the circum-
stances present here and by insisting that the investigation
proceed by subpoena duces tecum, whether on the theory
that the latter is a less intrusive alternative, or otherwise.u
The majority opinion has thus fashioned a construction of
the fourth amendment which categorically states that a show-
ing of probable cause to search justifies the issuance of a search
warrant against any third party, regardless of the extent and
nature of his or her expectation of privacy. The Court hastily
added that this rule did not foreclose the possibility that an
otherwise proper search could be held unreasonable if the man-
ner in which it was executed was found to be unreasonable.2
This position approaches the untenable. The Court, after
rejecting the rule that a search based on a search warrant with
probable cause was reasonable per se, resorted to the next best
thing. It retained the overall test for "reasonableness," but
foreclosed any showing of the competing privacy interests when
utilizing the balancing test. Thus the determination as to
"reasonableness" must necessarily be conducted post facto.
Even if the scope of the search was later found to be unreasona-
ble, the strict standing rules effectively allow the product of the
21. 98 S. Ct. at 1977.
22. See T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERP ErATION 48 (1969); La
Fave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law. . . Has Not. . . Run Smooth,"
1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255, 260; Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court:
Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 664, 687 (1961). See also
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 359-60
(1974) (which contains a brief discussion of the different elements and which princi-
pally analyzes "reasonable searches").
23. 98 S. Ct. at 1977 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925)).
24. 98 S. Ct. at 1978.
25. Id. at 1978-79.
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unreasonable search to be admitted into evidence." Judging by
the result in Zurcher, grave doubts arise whether there is any
remedy for the one who has suffered the consequences of a third
party search. 2 If probable cause to search always overcomes a
recognized privacy right regardless of the type of evidence,
crime or privacy right involved, then "reasonableness" has
been effectively ousted as the touchstone of the fourth amend-
ment. As far as third parties are concerned, the
"reasonableness" standard, instead of being designed to pro-
tect against illegal searches, merely declares them to be unrea-
sonable after the fact. Such a determination will be too late to
rectify the invasion of privacy and, given the standing require-
ments of the exclusionary rule, will lack adequate judicial sanc-
tions.
Apparently, the Supreme Court felt it necessary to artic-
ulate a token balancing test, which would consider the public's
interest in efficient criminal prosecutions against the third par-
ties' interests, before finally deciding that such searches were
reasonable. In determining that the public's interest was supe-
rior to that of any third party interest, the Court developed
three conclusions. First, the past decisions of the Supreme
Court have established that a less strict standard of probable
cause is required when a search is not intended to acquire
evidence of crime against the possessor. Second, once the state
informs the third party that illegal materials are to be found
on his property, he becomes sufficiently culpable to justify the
issuance of a search warrant. Third, irreparable harm to law
26. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
27. The Supreme Court did not pass on the question of whether attorneys' fees may
be awarded to third parties under the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). The overriding issue is whether the absolute immunity enjoyed
by prosecutors, magistrates and those who cary out judicial orders has been overturned
by the new attorrneys' fees legislation. In this regard, see the legislative history of the
law which clearly establishes that the act was to be applied to all cases that were
pending at the time of its enactment. 122 CONG. REc. H12155 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976)
(remarks of Rep. Anderson); id. at H12160 (remarks of Rep. Drinan); id. at S17052
(daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Abourezk).
Whether the act embodies the common law immunities to fee awards as set forth
in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) is unclear. Lower courts have consistently
rejected the principle that a showing of "bad faith" is necessary before attorneys' fees
can be awarded. Alicia Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1977); Brown
v. Culpepper, 559 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1977); Bond v. Stanton, 555 F.2d 172 (7th Cir.
1977); Martinez Rodriguez v. Jiminez, 551 F.2d 877 (1st Cir. 1977); Pennsylvania v.
O'Neill, 431 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Wade v. Mississippi Co-op Extension Serv.,
424 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Miss. 1976).
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enforcement would result if search warrants could not regularly
issue against third parties.
A closer examination of these conclusions is appropriate.
The first conclusion, that prior cases have held that third party
searches are to be judged by some lesser standard of probable
cause,28 was based upon Camara v. Municipal Court.21 The
Court however placed too little emphasis on the fact that
Camara dealt only with "area inspections" whose purpose was
civil rather than criminal. Specifically, the Camara Court held
that routine inspections for health, fire and housing programs
were a less hostile intrusion than a search for criminal evi-
dence." Something less than full fourth amendment protec-
tions were at stake in Camara because the purposes of the
search were civil even though enforceable through criminal pro-
cedures. Ironically enough, the Court in Camara elevated,
rather than restricted, the fourth amendment interests of the
individual in municipal inspection situations by declaring that
such interests were more than "peripheral." '3'
Camara differs from Zurcher in one other important re-
spect. In Camara, the probable cause necessary for an area
inspection warrant was automatically satisfied if reasonable
legislative or administrative standards for conducting the
inspection were satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling.32
This method of meeting the probable cause standard in civil
inspections is altogether different than the stricter standards
necessary in criminal searches. The precise holding of Camara
is that an overriding governmental interest, which is civil in
nature, requires a less stringent standard of probable cause to
justify a limited inspection, particularly if the intrusion is less
than that occasioned by a search for criminal evidence. Zurcher
is simply inapposite.33
28. 98 S. Ct. at 1976.
29. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
30. Id. at 530.
31. Id. at 530-33.
32. Id. at 538.
33. The Court also alluded to the consistency of its position by citing Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) and United States v. Biswell, 406
U.S. 311 (1972) for the proposition that some limited searches may be accomplished
without a warrant. Neither case can support the rule of Zurcher. In Colonnade the
administrative search in question was one of an establishment which sold liquor. The
search was justified as reasonable on the basis of the long history of governmental
control of such businesses. 397 U.S. at 76.
Likewise, the Biswell case is not precedent for a lesser standard of probable cause
1978]
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The second conclusion of the Zurcher Court was that the
culpability of the third party increases when he is informed of
the presence of illegal materials. This increased culpability
then works to preclude his withholding of evidence.34 This
unique proposition was apparently triggered by a concession of
counsel for respondent newspaper.3 5 Regardless of its origin, it
is inimical to an ordered and fair criminal justice system that,
once a party is informed through legal process that there exists
a reasonable belief that he possesses evidence of a crime, his
assumed culpability works to foreclose any timely complaint
regarding his privacy interests or evidentiary privileges. This is
simply the Court's final holding couched in a moral vein. How-
ever if it is reworded, it is certainly no more palatable.
The third conclusion of the Court was by far the most im-
portant. Stating that whatever may be the uncertain gain in
privacy rights accruing to an individual by the protection of a
subpoena duces tecum the Court believed that the demon-
strated harm to effective law enforcement required a holding
in the government's favor .3 The main adverse effect of a sub-
poena duces tecum is the early warning of the police's desire
to obtain inculpatory evidence. This warning would obviously
cause the disappearance of evidence in some cases. In addition
to the possibility that a third party could take on the status of
a suspect as the investigation proceeded, the fear that he could
not be relied upon to preserve the evidence was responsible for
the Court's concern.3 7
These fears are obviously justified in some cases. However,
it is far-fetched to fashion a rule which presumes that every
third party will destroy evidence. Is it really possible that law-
yers, doctors and legitimate businesses are so potentially cor-
rupt that they cannot be trusted to preserve evidence de-
manded through a subpoena?
Where the law enforcement agency has a justifiable concern
over the impracticability of a subpoena, this fact may be shown
to an appropriate magistrate. Mechanisms can be provided for
in searches of third parties. That case upheld warrantless inspections of federally
licensed dealers in firearms. The search was upheld on the necessity of unannounced
inspections in the general regulatory scheme and the limited expectation of privacy of
the licensee. 406 U.S. at 316.
34. 98 S. Ct. at 1979.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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a speedy hearing on a motion to quash and the entire procedure
may be subject to only a short delay. This procedure would
seem to be appropriate, especially in matters which concern
recognized evidentiary privileges and elevated constitutional
rights. 38
SEARCHES OF NEWSPAPERS
Regardless of the merits of searching third parties without
a prior judicial determination, searches of newspapers uncon-
nected to criminal activity pose quite different problems. As a
preface, it should be noted that newspapers would certainly be
entitled to all of the arguments set forth in the prior section on
the issue of reasonableness. In addition, other protections
which would be invoked as actions involving questions of fourth
and first amendment values are fundamentally different from
cases of ordinary crime and present a special threat to constitu-
tionally protected speech. 9 In recognition of this unique threat
to first amendment values, the Supreme Court has consistently
required strict compliance with the warrant requirements and
procedures."
In Zurcher the Supreme Court rejected all of these argu-
ments and held that a long line of prior cases only established
that the warrant requirements be applied with "particular ex-
actitude."" Thus, the Court granted the press only a shade
greater protection than that enjoyed by third parties in gen-
eral .42
When the Court did not accept the newspaper's first
amendment arguments against searches, it necessarily classi-
fied the press as a simple third party nonsuspect. Categorizing
a newspaper as such, the arguments for allowing third party
38. The Court also expressed concern that a third party could resist a subpoena
under the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 1979-80 n.8. See Andresen v.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473-74 (1976), wherein it was said "the Fifth Amendment may
protect an individual from complying with a subpoena for the production of his per-
sonal records in his possession because the very act of production may constitute a
compulsory authentication of incriminating information .
39. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
40. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504-05 (1973); Heller v. New York, 413
U.S. 483, 489 (1973); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); A Quantity of Books
v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 208 (1964).
41. See 98 S. Ct. at 1981-82 and cases cited therein.
42. Exactly how much more protection is enjoyed by the press is unclear. Without
doubt, the words of "particular exactitude" were added to prevent fishing expeditions
in the newspaper's files.
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nonsuspects to be searched were equally applicable. However,
several of the assumptions on which the Court based its deci-
sion must be questioned when applied to news organizations.
For instance, it is difficult to believe that a newspaper would
violate the law by secreting or destroying evidence. The Court's
fears concerning true suspects having access to the property are
likewise inapplicable in the cases of newspapers. Similar reser-
vations about the culpability of the third party would seem to
be equally inapposite.43 Regardless of these fears, there exists
several theories which should have protected newspapers from
unannounced searches.
UNNECESSARY SOURCE DISCLOSURE
One of the primary complaints of the press is that searches
will unnecessarily divulge the identity of confidential sources
and lead to a chilling effect on the process of news gathering.
The Court's majority perfunctorily dismissed this argument by
stating that they were unconvinced that'confidential sources
would disappear because of the possibility that newspapers
could be searched without warning." This statement overlooks
the realities of the confidential relationship that serves as the
basis of much news gathering. If this confidentiality is broken,
then vital channels to facts will be closed.45
The Court cited Branzburg v. Hayes" in reaffirmance of its
position that confidential sources would notdisappear. It fur-
ther stated that whatever "incremental" difference existed be-
43. Justice Powell's concurring opinion contained the announced editorial position
of the Stanford Daily which was to destroy any evidence which would aid in the
prosecution of demonstrators. This policy was not presented to the magistrate who
initially issued the search warrant. 353 F. Supp. at 135 n.16. Thus, the editorial policy
was never an issue in the case, but certainly influenced the decision in the Supreme
Court. 98 S. Ct. at 1983 n.1. (Powell, J., concurring).
44. 98 S. Ct. at 1982.
45. See Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229
(1971); Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for
Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709 (1975); Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argu-
ment for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U. L. Rav. 18 (1969); Murasky,
The Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEx. L. REv. 829, 856-66
(1974); Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. Rav. 838
(1971); Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential
Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317 (1970); Comment, Constitutional Protection for the
Newsman's Work Product, 6 HARv. CIv. RIGHTS L. REV. 119 (1970); Comment, The
Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg: The Case for a Federal Shield Law, 24 U.C.L.A.
L. Rav. 160 (1976).
46. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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tween the Branzburg subpoena and the Zurcher search warrant
had no constitutional significance." However, this incremental
difference spoken of in Zurcher is more fundamental than the
Court wished to acknowledge.
The Branzburg case 8 dealt with the issue of whether a
reporter who had witnessed criminal acts could refuse to honor
a grand jury subpoena concerning those acts. The Court held
that the investigatory needs of the grand jury usually estab-
lished a compelling state interest which justified the indirect
and uncertain burden on the first amendment freedoms at
stake. 9 In addition, the Branzburg majority opinion recognized
that some type of constitutional protection for the function of
news gathering by the press was necesssary.5 0 The concurring
opinion by Justice Powell shed some light on the exact holding
of the Court. He asserted that the newsman's privilege must be
judged by a balancing of the freedom of the press against the
obligation of a citizen to give evidence concerning crimes.'
This balancing would take place after the reporter appeared
before the grand jury and refused to answer questions. A judge
would then decide whether the newspaperman's claim was jus-
tified.
One major difference in the two cases is that Branzburg
involved only the press function of news gathering. Zurcher not
only deals with the function of news gathering, but also in-
cludes the constitutionally protected roles of editing5 and dis-
tributing. 3 It should be remembered that a search of a newspa-
per office must necessarily be physically disruptive of the news
offices. It is highly doubtful that a law enforcement agent will
be able to quickly locate the desired materials without first
uncovering and scanning sundry unrelated memos, files and
other documents. Thus, the search will undoubtedly include
material that will have to be read and analyzed before the
information sought is located. 4 This probability of physical
47. 98 S. Ct. at 1982.
48. Branzburg dealt with three cases: Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th
Cir. 1970); Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970); In re Pappas, 358 Mass.
604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971).
49. 408 U.S. at 700-01.
50. Id. at 681.
51. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
52. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (where the Court
clearly protects "publication" which presumably would include the editing role).
53. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
54. There is obviously no set time limit in which a search must be conducted.
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disruption of the newsroom is present only during a search. The
use of a subpoena would allow the press sufficient time to lo-
cate the material and decide whether to file a motion to quash.
Zurcher and Branzburg can be distinguished further. In the
latter case, only the method of acquiring information through
a subpoena was at issue. A search warrant, on the other hand,
represents a much more serious invasion of the newspaper's
privacy interests. These interests are neither vague nor indefi-
nite and represent innumerable pledges of confidentiality
made to various sources. A subpoena, unlike a warrant, would
not disturb these vital privacy interests. Moreover, if a particu-
larly important confidential relationship were at issue, then the
newspaper would have an adequate opportunity to present its
position through a motion to quash.
In addition to the needless disclosure of confidential sources
that would necessarily occur through the execution of search
warrants, more drastic consequences will undoubtedly flow
from press searches. The primary fear is that newspapers will
experience a loss in credibility and independence. Subsequent
to Zurcher, a pledge of confidentiality must be viewed with
some misgivings. Since unannounced searches will expose the
protected confidences at stake, a reporter's pledge will be both
unsupportable and ineffectual.
A similar loss of credibility will be established if a newspa-
per loses its independence in news gathering and reporting. If
the press is informally and involuntarily impressed into the
service of law enforcement agencies as a subsidiary fact gather-
ing agent, it will lose its credibility as being the independent
eye and ear of the citizenry. The media's proper function is to
report the news in an independent and unbiased manner. To
the extent that the press favors one interest group over another,
however unwillingly, it loses its credibility. Favoritism for
effective law enforcement should be an editorial function of the
press and not a news or reporting function.
It is certainly not difficult to believe that the newsroom of
a major network or newspaper contains an inordinate amount
of "mere evidence" concerning many crimes. It is a rare night
that a major network does not report some details of suspected
Because of this, the potential for physical disruption cannot be discounted. One search
of a radio station in California lasted over eight hours which reportedly disrupted the
operation of the station. Note, Search and Seizure of the Media: A Statutory, Fourth
Amendment and First Amendment Analysis, 28 STAN. L. Rav. 957, 959 (1976).
[Vol. 62:35
IMPLICATIONS OF ZURCHER
criminal activity by a public figure. On a reduced scale it is
undoubtedly true that most reputable newspapers and media
outlets have special sources that they have nurtured through
the years in order that inside stories may be developed and
printed. If these sources disappear, then so too will the infor-
mation which is so vitally needed for an informed and enlight-
ened public. If this happens, the loss will be felt by everyone.
The public will be deprived of relevant and truthful stories, the
press will lose its independence and will fail to perform its
primary task and law enforcement agencies will, ironically
enough, lose important information and clues regarding mis-
conduct which they could otherwise have read in the paper.
Indeed, this latter situation existed in the Watergate scandal
and to a lesser extent in Koreagate. When police and other
agencies read about suspected criminal activity in the newspa-
per, they were naturally compelled to follow up on these stories
with their own investigations. When the press performs its ordi-
nary function of news gathering, it also collaterally serves as a
political impetus for local prosecutors to vigorously pursue un-
covered cases. This is the manner in which the system has
worked since the beginning of the nation.
THE FEASIBILITY OF A PRIOR HEARING
In Zurcher the Court came to the conclusion that a search
of a pressroom for criminal evidence would not necessarily con-
stitute a prior restraint. "5 In so holding, the Court apparently
distinguished cases where a seizure was used to temporarily
preserve materials for use as evidence in a criminal trial and
those cases where a seizure was for the purpose of confiscating
a large quantity of books or materials thereby effectively re-
moving them from circulation. "6
Justice White chose to view the situation as having "no
realistic threat of prior restraint . . . whatsoever . . . on...
[the] communication of ideas."57 Regardless of the peculiar
facts of the Zurcher case, it is difficult to believe that seizing a
journalist's work product is not a prior restraint. In the sense
that the newspaper would be unable to publish the work prod-
uct of the journalist, it would arguably constitute a "final"
restraint on the newspaper.
55. 98 S. Ct. at 1982.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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This decision also signaled an apparent change in the
Court's reasoning in situations where the execution of a state
law threatens first amendment freedoms. A consistent line of
cases had previously established that a prior adversary hearing
was required when a seizure of presumptively protected materi-
als endangered their exhibition or circulation.51 In Zurcher the
Court required no prior adversary hearing because the hazards
of infringing upon the first amendment could be adequately
monitored and controlled by the magistrate issuing the search
warrant.59 This certainly signals a change of course since the
time when the Court held:
The value of a judicial proceeding, as against self-help by
the police, is substantially diluted where the process is ex
parte, because the Court does not have available the funda-
mental instrument for judicial judgment: an adversary pro-
ceeding in which both parties may participate . . . . In the
absence of evidence and argument offered by both sides and
of their participation in the formulation of value judgments,
there is insufficient assurance of the balanced analysis and
careful conclusions which are essential in the area of First
Amendment adjudication."
The approval of ex parte hearings obviously bypasses any
argument which the press could use at the hearing and further
reduces the information which is made available to the magis-
trate. It is inconceivable that the police would or could care-
fully explain the newspaper's constitutional objections.
An ex parte hearing also is a departure from the Branzburg
rationale which mandated a prior judicial hearing before a
newsman could be compelled to divulge confidential informa-
tion. Indeed, Justice Powell's concurrence required the striking
of a proper balance by adjudicating the claims on a case-by-
case basis:
[Ihf the newsman is called upon to give information bearing
only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the
investigation, or if he has some other reason to believe that
his testimony implicates confidential source relationships
without a legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have
58. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 490 (1973); Carroll v. President & Comm'rs
of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205
(1964); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
59. 98 S. Ct. at 1982.
60. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968)
(footnote omitted).
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access to the court on a motion to quash. . .. The asserted
claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking
of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the
obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony .... 6
As previously stated, Justice White felt that an ex parte
hearing would be acceptable since the issuing magistrate would
have sufficient control over the scope of the search warrant.
2
The warrant requirements must be applied by the magistrate
with "particular exactitude" 3 when first amendment freedoms
are endangered by a search. The concurring opinion of Justice
Powell importantly added that a magistrate should consider
the "independent values protected by the First Amendment." 4
It is doubtful whether an ex parte hearing can satisfactorily
safeguard the first amendment interests at stake in press
searches. In relying on the magistrate's discretion in fashioning
the scope of the warrant, the Court has probably misplaced its
reliance for a variety of reasons.
First, as Zurcher and Branzburg both illustrate, cases that
concern a conflict of first and fourth amendment values are
most difficult to reconcile. The close vote in each case high-
lights the fact that the Court itself is troubled concerning the
proper combination of first and fourth amendment values to
weigh in the decision." Thus, the Court while requiring a mag-
istrate to balance these competing interests, has not formed
any guidelines other than that the requirements of specificity
and reasonableness be strictly followed.
The absence of definitive guidelines is problem enough, but
when the magistrate must balance the respective interests
without any input from the press, the entire process becomes
unworkable. By stating that the newspaper's objections are not
needed, the Court has assured a process that will consistently
work in favor of law enforcement.
Thirdly, many states allow search warrants to be issued by
judicial officeholders at many levels. These include the various
judges of municipal, police and city courts. Indeed, state laws
61. 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
62. 98 S. Ct. at 1982.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1984.
65. The vote was 5-3 in Zurcher with Justices Marshall, Stewart and Stevens
dissenting and Justice Brennan not taking part. In Branzburg the vote was 5-4 with
Justices Marshall, Brennan, Stewart and Douglas dissenting.
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vary to such an extent that there is no uniform requirement
that judges or justices of the peace be lawyers or even that they
ever studied law. The notion of allowing these "magistrates"
to balance the competing constitutional interests when one of
the involved parties is absent is irrational.
Moreover, in many instances, magistrates and law enforce-
ment officials establish a relationship over a period of time that
presupposes the police officer's good faith in seeking the war-
rant. This type of imperfect relationship is even more danger-
ous in an ex parte proceeding where the magistrate must as-
sume the necessary neutral and detached posture. Even if a
magistrate were to deny a search warrant, there is nothing to
prevent another magistrate more sympathetic to law enforce-
ment from issuing another. The absence of any uniform rules
and the use of ex parte hearings will undoubtedly highlight
these deficiencies.
CONCLUSION
The ultimate effect of the Zurcher decision will probably
not be felt for some length of time. It is difficult to imagine that
police forces will suddenly resort to large scale searches of
newspapers and media outlets in order to secure information of
suspected crimes. However, giving law enforcement officials
carte blanche to search the press destroys the careful balance
which has characterized press-police relations. That balance
was reached through the mutual respect of the law enforcement
authorities and the press for one another. When the Court
chooses to ignore the very real threat to the freedom of the press
presented by Zurcher, it necessarily upsets that delicate bal-
ance. One certainly does not have to be enamored with the
press to understand and respect its important role in modern
American society. Strangely enough, if the law enforcement
authorities begin to make use of this new search rule in newspa-
per cases, they will undoubtedly find that the procedure is
counterproductive. Arbitrary and wholesale searches of news
gathering organizations will undoubtedly constitute the most
destructive element in the area of police-community relations.
Since the constitutional question has apparently been set-
tled, the remedy lies in an appropriate legislative response.
Only through the mechanism of legislation can the proper bal-
ance be reinstated between the press and law enforcement. In
view of the danger of a search warrant bypassing relevant state
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shield laws,6" the necessity of a legislatively mandated hearing
becomes apparent. Without the opportunity to appear and
claim one's statutory privilege, the privilege is meaningless
because a mere demonstration of probable cause will always
take precedence in an ex parte hearing. After the Court's deci-
sion in Zurcher, the need for protective legislation for the press
is essential. The initiative is now with the legislature of each
state. If the representatives of the several states act accord-
ingly, this unwise judicial decision may yet be remedied.
66. Shield laws which protect confidential information are currently in force in at
least 26 states. However, the protection of these various statutes can be easily circum-
vented by the acquiring of a search warrant. See generally Note, Search and Seizure
of the Media: A Statutory, Fourth Amendment and First Amendment Analysis, 28
STAN. L. REv. 957, 960-71 (1976).
67. At this writing, substantial efforts are underway on the federal level to afford
protection to the print and broadcast media. Two bills introduced in the United States
House of Representatives provide that a prior adversary court proceeding must take
place before a third party search of a print or broadcast news organization is under-
taken. H.R. 13284, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. 6081-(1978); H.R. 13285, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 6081 (1978).
For other sources that provide a valuable insight to these issues, see HousE COMM.
ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, SEARCH WARRANTS AND THE EFFECTS OF THE STANFORD
DAILY DECISION, H.R. REP. No.'1521, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); Justice Department
Policy Concerning News Media Search Warrants: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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